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Abstract: In this volume Wolf-Michael Roth provides a critical but partial reading of 
Tony  Brown’s  book  Mathematics  Education  and  Subjectivity.  The  reading  contrasts 
Brown’s approach with Roth’s own conception of subjectivity as derived from the work 
of Vygotsky, in which Roth aims to “reunite” psychology and sociology.  Brown’s book, 
however, focuses on how discourses in mathematics education shape subjective action 
within a Lacanian model that circumnavigates both “psychology” and “sociology”. From 
that  platform  this  paper  responds  to  Roth  through  problematising  the  idea  of  the 
individual  as  a  subjective  entity  in  relation  to  the  two  perspectives,  with  some 
consideration of corporeality and of how the Symbolic encounters the Real.  The paper 
argues for a Lacanian conception of subjectivity for mathematics education comprising a 
response to a social demand borne of an ever-changing symbolic order that defines our 
constitution and our space for action. The paper concludes by considering an attitude to 
the  production  of  research  objects  in  mathematics  education  research  that  resists  the 
normalization of assumptions as to how humans encounter mathematics.
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Introduction
Mathematics Education and Subjectivity (MES, Brown, 2011) 
rethinks mathematical teaching and learning with view to changing them to meet or 
resist emerging demands. Through considering how teachers, students and researchers 
make sense of their worlds, the book explores how some linguistic and socio-cultural 
locations  link  to  prevalent  conceptions  of  mathematics  education.  The  locations 
include  classroom  mathematics,  spatial  awareness,  media  images  of  mathematics, 
curriculum development, teacher education and mathematics education research itself. 
The book introduces cutting edge theories of subjectivity that trouble more familiar 
psychological theories of ‘humans’ apprehending mathematical ‘concepts’. Rather, it 
suggests that our senses of self and of mathematics result from self-reflections within 
the various localities in which we live. In foregrounding subjectivity the book shows 
how mathematics can provoke alternative ways of thinking towards enlivening our 
transformative  capacities.  Learning  itself  is  depicted  as  participation  in  cultural 
renewal,  where  the  very  mathematics  encountered  is  becoming  something  new. 
Addressing teachers, teacher educators and researchers, the book invites the reader to 
contemplate alternative trajectories of change into fresh ways of being. (Back cover)
A key theoretical point of the book is that we always occupy an ideologically defined 
location and that we might productively consider how the current state of affairs shapes 
our actions. Žižek (e.g. 1989) suggests that we are practically compliant to the ideologies 
that govern our lives even if we do not notice this compliance, since we are radicals in 
our thoughts and dreams. The book explores these ideological formations in mathematics 
education, to see how they work, so that we might see in a different way the potential  
trajectories  of  change.  The book specifically  discusses  how mathematics  education  is 
conceived and how such conceptions result in particular understandings of what it is to be 
a teacher or a student, and how this produces the mathematical phenomena in question. 
Wolf-Michael  Roth’s  (2012) substantial  and interesting  review in this  issue correctly 
reminds us that the book’s ideologically defined location will create its own blind spots. 
For  example,  the  book  asserts  that  “psychology”,  variously  attributed  to  Piaget  and 
Vygotsky,  is  benignly  blended  into  theories  of  mathematics  education  research 
normalizing certain assumptions as to how mathematics is encountered. In making this 
assertion  Roth  argues  that  the  book’s  account  of  Vygotsky  is  incomplete  and  Roth 
counters the book’s arguments with his own account of subjectivity derived from the 
work  of  Vygotsky.  More  generally,  the  book  argues  that  the  linguistic  norms  that 
characterize argumentation in mathematics education research result in particular forms 
of  sense  making.  Consequently,  certain  forms  of  argumentation  or  modes  of  object 
creation available in other areas of the cultural sciences are not typically picked up by the 
scanners of mathematics education research leading to the exclusion of some productive 
approaches. Roth argues that the book’s success lies in its capacity to disrupt familiar 
pathways in mathematics education research but in so doing it destabilizes the ground 
from which we could inspect newer alternatives. This opens the door to further reflection 
on how we conceptualise change and cultural growth through attempted reconciliation of 
the alternative models.
This paper mediates contrasting claims made in respect of two alternative conceptions of 
subjectivity.  More generally,  Roth (2010) aims to “reunite” psychology and sociology 
through a reconceptualisation  of  the individual. The book favours  a  Lacanian  model, 
which includes neither “psychology” nor “sociology” in its brief. The scene is set in the 
paper by contrasting how Roth and the book each reference the work of Vygotsky. From 
this platform the paper goes on to problematise the idea of the individual in relation to the 
two  perspectives  with  some  consideration  of  corporeality  and  of  how  the  symbolic 
encounters the material. I engage with Roth’s more direct discussion of Lacan towards 
challenging some of the other issues that he raises through showing how Lacan’s later 
work supports persistent adjustment to new conditions.  The paper develops a Lacanian 
conception of subjectivity for mathematics education comprising a response to a social 
demand borne of an ever-changing symbolic order that defines our material constitution 
and  our  space  for  action. The  paper  concludes  by  considering  an  attitude  to  the 
production  of  research  objects  in  mathematics  education  research  that  resists  the 
normalization of assumptions as to how humans encounter mathematics.
On Vygotsky
Vygotsky and activity theory  are discussed more extensively in Roth’s 25-page review 
than they are  in  the  234 pages  of  the  book.  Vygotsky’s  theory had been introduced 
primarily to orientate the book’s core discussion of ideology for a general mathematics 
education audience. I am not a Vygotsky scholar but as the author of MES I was making 
an attempt to orientate the less familiar Lacanian psychoanalytic theories (e.g. 2008) to 
better-known  material  in  the  field.  Vygotskian  inspired  activity  theory,  however, is 
Roth’s intellectual home base as evidenced in numerous publications. His review spends 
much of its  space there,  critically  referencing the relatively oblique discussion of the 
theory in MES. Notwithstanding his many complimentary observations, MES is not what 
Roth had wanted it to be. His search criterion is reminiscent of the man who looks for his 
lost keys under a streetlight where he can see, rather than across the road where he may 
have dropped them. One solution might be for me to get my Vygotsky act together so that 
in this paper I could more effectively counter Roth’s concerns, now that Roth has re-
centred the debate in that domain. My preferred option however is to restore balance by 
emphasising that my own core frame of reference is centred on the Lacanian theories of 
Badiou and Žižek who continue writing to this day with no reference to the Russian and 
his followers as far as I know. I refer many more times to these authors, authors that Roth 
completely fails to mention in his review and in so doing Roth misrepresents the main 
theoretical thrust of the book. The book is centred on showing how contemporary theory 
by living writers offers new analytical resources. In restoring balance, however, the paper 
will keep to the areas of concern that Roth shares, whilst resisting his tendency to see the 
issues exclusively through his chosen analytical filter. 
Yet given Roth’s chosen theme it is surprising that his review so quickly skates over the 
most  extensive direct  comparison that  MES makes of Vygotsky and Lacan.  As MES 
indicates,  Lacan and Vygotsky would  both  claim that  humans  feed  off  the linguistic 
apparatus that surrounds them. For both authors, “We become ourselves through others” 
(Vygotskij, cited by Roth, all Roth quotes are from his paper in this issue). They would 
wholly differ, however, in their understanding of how humans and their formation relate 
to symbolic mediation (more later). Vygotsky’s notion of Zone of Proximal Development  
(ZPD) has  been popularised  in  many instances  of  mathematics  education  research as 
bringing children into the social world. I trust that Roth is more precise: “through the 
child, the societal becomes individualised and concretised.” Yet Vygotsky’s work in the 
very different circumstances that he encountered during his lifetime has been subject to 
multiple readings within the cultural imaginary of mathematics education research. Bibby 
(2010, p. 38) argues that the “seductive imagery conjured by Vygotsky’s metaphor … 
allows us to ignore the difficulties and resistances which the learner will encounter and 
develop”. She continues: “the metaphor encourages us to ignore any differences between 
the learner and the teacher and seems to suggest that the learner’s differences will be 
unimportant and willingly subjugated to the teacher’s benevolent intentions.” 
Whatever depiction we choose Vygotsky’s ZPD contrasts sharply with Lacan’s (1986, 
pp.  203-215) assertion  that  humans’  alienation  from language is  built  into  their  very 
constitution  as  subjects. As  we  shall  see  later,  the  subject’s  constitution  in  Lacan’s 
formulation is not, as Roth persistently suggests throughout his piece, divorced from the 
body or living being (more later).  For Lacan, however, the language used to describe 
people  never  quite  fits  with  their  own sense  of  reality,  “the  imaginary  is  enough to 
motivate all sorts of behaviour in the living being.” (p. 207, my emphasis) And they can 
be alienated from the very apparatus used to include them. In Vygotsky’s  model,  the 
child’s environment provides both the form and content of his personality, even if that 
personality  is  “individualised”.  On the  contrary,  for  Lacan,  dialogue functions  as  the 
alienating experience. Teachers may or may not identify with particular aspects of the 
curriculum they  are  charged  to  present.  Children  may  or  may  not  connect  with  the 
account of the world that the teacher provides. The space, between the place assigned and 
the place taken, results in a “permanent hunger” to close the gap (Emerson, 1983). This 
hunger  is  never satisfied.  The only way out of any restrictive  caricature  of self  is  to 
accept  the  turbulence  of  participation  in  discursive  activity,  and  this  participation 
produces real effects  on the body’s formation.  For Lacan any attempted identification 
with specific discourses or ideologies is tainted by the individual’s desire to please, to 
respond to the demands she perceives (from the Other), even though, as Lacan claims in 
his later work, those demands may not actually exist. Importantly, however, the difficulty 
in fit, the alienation, can be experienced as a  positive condition, releasing an individual 
who has grown out of the discursive clothing bestowed upon her. 
“It is evident that the Russian scholar has anticipated Lacan”. I am rather skeptical on this 
point. Roth overreaches himself in attributing rather too much of the thought of the late 
twentieth century, and in particular, too many aspects of Lacan’s writing, to being a later 
day exemplification of Vygotsky. It may be that Vygotsky provides a particular solution 
to  the  issues  in  question,  but  the  point  of  MES  was  to  show  how Lacan  offers  an 
alternative approach. Lacan’s work as developed by more recent writers better supports 
more recent conceptions of subjectivity introduced long after Vygotsky passed away, and 
which provide an alternative to present day Vygotskian formulations. In the next section I 
seek to  paint  the new territory occupied  by Lacan and link it  to  work by Žižek and 
Badiou. Conceptions of “psychology” as attributed to Piaget and Vygotsky, so often used 
in support of mathematics education research, take an altogether more marginal place in 
MES, as strictly alternative points of reference. The wider notion of subjectivity shifts the 
focus of the book on to the multiplicity of readings available in the diverse circumstances 
we face today where consensus on how the world is marked out is not readily achieved. 
The generation of theory provides alternative analytical filters through which we can read 
contemporary  circumstances,  as  exemplified  in  the  last  Special  Issue  of  this  journal 
(Brown & Walshaw, 2012). 
The  remainder  of  the  paper  addresses  Roth’s  discussion  of  Lacan  within  MES.  I 
commence with a brief sketch of Lacan and two of his followers. Taking the example of 
the “mathematics education researcher” I consider how subjectivity may be associated 
with conceptions  of the acting  human (Roth’s sections  2.1,  2.5).  I  briefly  interrogate 
Roth’s discussion of language games (2.2). I devote more space to corporeality (2.3) in 
approaching  Lacan’s  notion  of  the  Real,  since  that  important  dimension  of  Lacan’s 
thinking  is  absent  from  Roth’s  analysis  (3.11).  I  respond  to  Roth’s  conceptions  of 
1 Lacan’s diagram, as reproduced by Roth as his Fig. 2, comprises the lower levels of Lacan’s more sophisticated 
graph of desire, as discussed by Žižek (1989, pp. 87-129). Žižek discusses the interplay of discourse and enjoyment 
(jouissance), where enjoyment comprises the emotional flows that are activated that transcend mere discourse.
subjectivity,  relationality  and  the  discursive  networks  to  which  actions,  bodies  and 
personalities  are  referenced  (3.2).  I  conclude  by  defining  a  more  precise  distinction 
between  how  Roth  (3.3)  and  I  conceptualise  subjectivity.  My  concluding  section 
conceptualises  the  production  of  psychoanalytic  material  as  story  telling  in  which 
research objects derive from ever shifting perspectives (4). I bypass Roth’s discussion of 
cultural history (2.4) for reasons of space.
On Lacan
Lacan, Žižek, Badiou
Lacan’s  notion  of  the  subject  was  initiated  through  his  work  in  psychoanalysis  with 
individual clients.  The accounts provided by these clients became the material  for his 
analysis. These accounts can be seen as localised cases of the wider discursive network, a 
revelation that loosens their connection to the client seen as a standalone living being. 
(This  is  not  to  say  that  the  living  being  was  unaffected  by  the  production  of  these 
accounts–  more  later.)  The  human  subject  was  defined  according  to  the  descriptions 
available within this network. Indeed the accounts alerted us to how human individuals 
derived from this wider network. Individuals might no longer be considered primarily as 
stand alone biological entities but rather as consequences of particular events, or social 
movements, where the individual is understood in terms of his or her identification with 
these events. The internet, for example, produces conceptions of humans. Facebook can 
celebrate the personalities of individuals but then convert them into mere statistics in a 
large-scale consumer survey linked to a sales drive or election campaign. 
Many perspectives  on Lacan present  in  MES have been accessed  through  Žižek and 
Badiou, major thinkers in their own right today, concerned with contemporary themes.
Žižek’s  work  is  centred  on  how  culture  (films,  artistic  productions,  jokes,  flower 
arrangements,  news  reports,  television  broadcasts,  the  internet,  PISA  test  items)  is 
revelatory of how the society thinks of itself. Cultural life is not so much centred in the 
individual. Rather, the individual is understood through his or her identifications with or 
participation in certain aspects of cultural  life.  Yet in this Lacanian formulation these 
identifications are never quite secure. The subject mistakenly recognises versions of self 
in this symbolic network that are never quite sustainable. Try as I might I am not like 
George Clooney. This alienation, the gap between place assumed and the place assigned, 
mobilises subjectivity to find a more comfortable space, yet instead finds that it cannot be 
encapsulated in any given symbolic form. No story quite fits. Life in such circumstances 
is governed by unconscious forces and set moves, which shore up the gaps in any overt 
story that an individual might confidently present.
Badiou’s notion of subjectivity (e.g., 2009) also takes a radical step beyond a concern 
with the individual human in a therapeutic encounter. He drops any privileged link to the 
living being in favour of seeing subjectivity in terms of identification with a movement to 
a  new  state  of  affairs.  For  example,  Spartacus  was  instrumental  in  an  anti-slavery 
movement  that  transcended  the  individual  human  Spartacus.  Spartacus’  identification 
with the anti-slavery movement, the collective assertion of a cause, was more important 
in locating subjectivity than his individual humanity. Thus subjectivity is associated with 
a redistribution of the psychological, where perhaps our whole concept of what it is to be 
human (a teacher, a student) has shifted to a new configuration, and where perhaps the 
individual human’s operative role is rather less central  than was previously supposed. 
Critchley (2008, p. 44) argues: “One can only speak of the subject in Badiou as a subject-
in-becoming  insofar  as  it  shapes  itself  in  relation  to  the  demand apprehended  in  a 
situation” (my emphasis).
The place of subjectivity: the case of the mathematics education researcher
In addressing the term “subjectivity” one may reflect on one’s own common usage of 
other familiar terms (such as, individuality, sociality, psychology). Roth (2.1) introduces 
Leont’ev’s activity theory towards criticising what he sees as overly casual use of the 
term “social”  in  MES.  He  distinguishes  the  term from “societal”,  which  he  sees  as 
relating  to  the  political/ideological  system.  It  seems  unproductive  to  spend  too  long 
differentiating between the ways in which the terms are used by alternative traditions. 
The point had been to contrast Radford’s teaching approach with an alternative approach 
in pinpointing subjective engagement.  The difference related to the way in which the 
terms of reference for the given activity (or language game) were set and whether these 
terms were negotiable or not. The students either followed sequences pre-determined by 
their teacher in Radford’s example or set their own parameters for sequences in MES. 
The demands from one case to the next were very different. The student response was a 
function of how he or she was subjected to the pedagogical space in question.
Roth  (2.1)  picks  up  on  a  theme  already  debated  in  the  pages  of  this  journal  and 
subsequently included in MES. My response to an  Educational Studies in Mathematics 
Special Issue on semiotics led to a reply from two of the authors involved (Presmeg & 
Radford, 2008). The issue at stake also related to how individuals respond to a given field 
for  action.  I  conceptualised  the  subject  “mathematics  education  researcher.”  What  is 
demanded of  such  a  designation  (journal  or  funding  agency  criteria,  employer 
expectations,  professional  self  image,  etc.)?  How  do  individuals  follow  such  a 
designation? Are there preferred ways of aligning with the designation? The mathematics 
education  researcher  could  research  how  to  improve  the  current  set  of  teachers  (by 
improving their techniques, changing the curriculum, setting new priorities), or s/he could 
research how to get a new set of teachers (paying people to train in this area, relocating 
troops into teaching, benefitting from the new popularity of physics). Do, for example, 
particular  conceptualisations  of what research is  lead to a disproportionate  number of 
research papers where certain perspectives are revealed, thereby normalising particular 
accounts of what it is to be such a researcher, and in turn what constitutes research? One 
can conceptualise  subjectivity more generally as being a response to a  demand  or an 
expectation of what is required by a particular designation.
Authors  in  the  Special  Issue  discussed a  range of  themes,  but,  MES argued that  the 
emphasis of the work overall supported the proliferation and normalisation of particular 
research  perspectives.  In  the  case  in  question,  there  was  a  tendency  towards  using 
Piagetian and Vygotskian psychological models. That is, the subjectivity of “mathematics 
education researcher” was conceptualised with respect to particular psychological filters. 
More  generally,  MES sought  to  argue  that  a  disproportionate  volume  of  research  in 
mathematics education is directed to the improvement of teacher technique, perhaps at 
the  expense  of  ignoring  other  more  effective  levers.  Similarly,  Roth’s  account  of  a 
teacher-student  dialogue  (in  3.2)  emphasises  the  quality  of  inter-personal  exchange, 
within a rather localised activity framework. The need to meet publishing criteria can 
influence the research author’s conception of who they are and what they are trying to do, 
the style of paper submitted and the way in which mathematics (e.g. seen as knowledge, 
analytical  apparatus,  problem solving,  or  basic  skills),  teachers  (e.g.  as  didacticians, 
facilitators,  inspirational  figures,  carers)  and  students  (e.g.  performing  in  tests, 
independent thinking, obedient) may be conceptualised. Roth (2.1) asks “Do we tell what 
has happened to us during any particular working day in exactly the same way to our 5-
year-old  son,  our  mathematics  education  colleague,  the  hairdresser,  or  spouse?  We 
don’t!” There is however a risk that we always  go down the same tram tracks when 
talking  to  our  audience  of  mathematics  education  colleagues  since  our  working 
environment is governed by certain norms, preferences, habits and expectations, which 
result  in certain  styles  of familiar  action that  may preserve past inequities,  redundant 
models of practice and tired theoretical paradigms. MES argued that there are substantial 
gaps in the scope of mathematics education research, which is not the fault of individual 
authors as emphasised (p. 88), but rather the economy of such research does not support 
interest or coverage in certain areas. There are blind spots. The ideological dimensions of 
mathematics education shape practices, practices about which we are not always fully 
aware. We must persistently attend to the assumptions that we are making in setting the 
terms of reference for mathematics education research.
Language games and renewal
Roth’s critique (2.2) notes two places where MES “complains”: the “individual is obliged 
to use these languages if they are to be included in social exchanges” (MES, p. 105); “[i]n 
this  way  the  human  subject  identifies  with  something  outside  of  himself.  They  see 
themselves  in  the  social  languages,  but  the  languages  never  quite  fit”  (ibid).  Roth 
associates  these two statements  with participation in language games  as if the games 
already exist and can be participated in according to certain fixed rules, such as in a game 
of football. As suggested above, however, identifications with the discursive environment 
in the open sense that Roth depicts by way of Derrida are never quite secure. I fully 
applaud Roth’s opening remarks where he states: “With every word, (the old) language 
dies and (a new) language is re/born.” This is a point of strong agreement between us.  
Although Roth (4) seems to be doubting this point when its sense shifts later: “It may be 
detrimental to good theory if the categories shift in translation.” Similarly,  theory may 
slip if  meaning shifts in translation from one  use (Wittgenstein) to another. In  Lacan’s 
conception of the subject, however, the deluded fellow mistakenly recognises and lives 
by versions of self in these symbolic networks that are not sustainable. The story telling 
individual cannot keep up with events and casts an imaginary layer over everything to 
make sense of the turbulence in unpredictable ways. The gap between place assumed and 
the place assigned, mobilises subjectivity such that it cannot be encapsulated in any given 
symbolic form. It is this very failure that gives the subject license. In the first statement, 
rather than complaining, MES was hinting at the costs and benefits associated with fitting 
in with the current collective story. This is rather akin to Roth’s (3.2) statement: “The 
language, however, is not that of Mrs. Turner. She does not invent it here, but it has come 
to her from the generalized other, to whom, in her utterance, it returns. She is not only the 
subject who uses the language, but she also is subject to it and the things it can express.” 
The second statement slightly disrupts this however. MES was celebrating the human 
subject’s ability to transform the state of affairs as a result of the rules, or the language, 
never  quite  working. The  alienation can  be  experienced  as  a  positive condition  that 
renews the conception of the “game” guiding action. There is not a game as such, but 
rather successive shifts of discursive filters that can successively and radically redefine 
the field of play (for the game, as it were). 
In the case of geometry,  for example,  I do have the option of playing to the rules of 
established school geometry. But can I be sure that those rules really are stable? If I was 
to consult my son’s last exam paper in this area I would find a much depleted conception 
of geometry propping up a test designed to be consistent in style with wider TIMSS/PISA 
assessment  where  geometrical  concepts  are  partitioned  in  very  specific  ways  into 
questions of a particular form. Quite apart from the formal rules of geometry, that which 
counts  as  school  mathematics  is  constantly  shifting  as  a  result  of  the 
pedagogical/curricula layers being permanently on the move in response to ever-shifting 
administrative demands (Brown & Clarke, in press). More positively, there will be other 
wholly  contemporary  depictions  of  geometry,  such  as  those  developed  within  recent 
technologies, opening whole new worlds of spatial awareness. Geometry cannot readily 
be seen as being independent of its social filter or language game, except that we are in a 
permanent  state  of  adjusting  to  the supposed rules  of  new games,  or  new emphases, 
adjustments triggered by failures of fit within previous versions of life. Any such cultural 
adjustment needs to be worked through by individuals and by groups of individuals who 
are never in the place of their ancestors. “With every word…”
Corporeality and the Real
As seen Lacan’s psychoanalytic procedures produced accounts from patients as symbolic 
material, which could also be seen as a function of wider discursive activity – an example 
of how people talked more generally. As a patient this would make up part of the story of 
who I am, and of who we are. But this story also produces who I am as a physical entity 
in tune with my environment. For example, within mathematics education research there 
has been much work on the theme of gesture and with how mathematical phenomena are 
referenced or evoked by bodily movement. This work might be understood as an attempt 
to  understand  the  subject’s  identification  to  the  physical  world  as  seen  through  a 
mathematical lens. Mathematical understanding is expressed through gesture. DeFreitas 
and Sinclair (2012) provide a recent example linking this theme to contemporary issues 
of  subjectivity,  contrasting  gestures  and  diagrams  as  alternative  modes  of  physical 
representation of mathematical phenomena. The more general issue, however, relates to 
how the subject connects with the world through a mathematical or scientific lens. How 
does  the  subject  produce  herself  within  a  world  understood  mathematically  or 
scientifically? MES provides extensive discussion of students bodily situating themselves 
in,  or  moving  within,  large  spatial  environments  as  understood  through  certain 
mathematical or scientific filters, jokingly referred to as extreme gesturing. Pedagogical 
apparatus  more  generally  however  is  produced  according  to  supposed  modes  of 
apprehension, such as; inside/outside, within a count, grouped according to criteria, in the 
form of a graph, having been shrunk to an infinitely small point, etc. A mathematical 
account might be seen as the end point of a process of achieving an ever more precise 
story of my experience, such as in reaching a generalisation. I am the subject of the story 
I tell  and reveal who I think I am through the way I reflexively situate myself in the 
telling of that story: a portrayal of a mathematical me. Žižek’s work is centred on the fact 
that we declare who we are through our cultural productions. Likewise we might assert 
our collective mathematical identity, or more specifically, what counts as mathematics in 
schools.
In Lacan’s (2008, p. 81) terminology this story telling might be understood as follows: 
The subject is dependent on the articulated chain represented by science’s acquired 
knowledge. The subject has to take his place there, situate himself as best he can in 
the implications  of that chain.  He constantly has to revise all  the little  intuitive 
representations he has come up with, and which becomes part of the world, and 
even  the  so-called  intuitive  categories.  He’s  always  having  to  make  some 
improvements to the apparatus, just to find somewhere to live. It’s a wonder he 
hasn’t been kicked out of the system by now. And that is in fact the goal of the 
system. In other words, the system fails. That is why the subject lasts. (MES, p. 
123)
In  other  words,  the  scientifically  defined  universe  contingently  defines  worlds  (e.g. 
Newtonian conceived space, food security patterns, Gross Domestic Products), and the 
physical coordinates of the human’s place within them. The individual (such as the child 
described  by  Roth  living  on  a  coffee  plantation),  however,  may  not  be  especially 
comfortable  with  these  assigned  places  provoking  consequences  to  these  perceived 
failures of fit (e.g. medicinal, nutritional, statistical, normative). For example, Piagetian 
psychology, so influential in earlier accounts of mathematical learning, has a preference 
for  defining  individuals  in  terms  of  various  physical  or  responsive  attributes,  or 
developmental stages, which may bypass the affective or creative sense of self possessed 
by the individual herself. Or alternatively, the individual human might too compliantly 
accept  externally  applied  designations  –  a  reduction  of  life  that  will  ultimately  be 
resisted2.  Lacan’s  model  locates  life  as  a  negotiation  in  which  the  individual  works 
through  successive  accounts  of  the  world,  each  of  which  points  to  a  place  for  the 
individual. Lacan mocks the failure of scientific constructs to keep up to date, consigned 
as  they  are  to  the  need  for  regular  renewal,  whilst  the  human  always  survives.  For 
example, economic models are notoriously unstable yet maintain a crucial presence in 
our  attempts  to  control  our  relation  to  life  through mathematical  apparatus.  Physical 
models of the universe move rather more slowly,  but no less radically.  But what lies 
beyond this symbolic modelling? Or perhaps, how is the modelling motivated? Lacan’s 
2 This resistance would take the form of jouissance, a surplus to the discursive experience.
answer is “the Real”. I need to clear some preliminary points, however, before explaining 
this important term that is missed in Roth’s analysis.
Lacan always moved on, defying any straightforward representation of his ideas. One 
only needs to read any random paragraph from his immense body of work, or the two 
paragraphs included in this present piece, to realise he favoured a poetic style and the 
provocation  of  unsteady responses  over  the  delivery of  stable  ideas.  Notwithstanding 
Roth’s greater access to Lacan’s style  as a result of his linguistic background, Roth’s 
review (e.g. 3.1, 4) focuses on controversial readings of a very specific phase of Lacan’s 
work3,  namely  the  middle  period  from the  fifties,  where  the  influence  of  Saussure’s 
structural  linguistics  was  at  its  greatest.  In  addressing  this  aspect  Roth  incorrectly 
separates Lacan’s three orders of the Imaginary, the Symbolic, and the Real, which relate 
symbolic activity to the tangibility of the world we encounter. The work of  Žižek and 
Badiou referred to in MES is centred on a later Lacan. By this time Lacan had been 
exposed to a more diverse audience stretching beyond the therapeutic community. 
The  key  difference  between  the  middle  and  later  periods  of  Lacan’s  work  is  the 
prominence in his later work of what he calls “the Real”. The Real is variously defined 
over the years but relates to that which is beyond the scope of representation, “that which 
resists, the impossible,  that which always comes back the same place, the limit of all  
symbolisation” (Lacan, quoted by Critchley, 2008, p. 63). Critchley continues: “The basic 
thought here is that the real is that which exceeds and resists the subject’s powers of 
conceptualisation or the reach of its  criteria”.  The thought can never comprise a well 
defined signified. Lacan’s later emphasis on the Real cuts across Roth’s supposition that 
“Lacan  focuses  exclusively  on  language”.  For  Lacan  (1986,  p.  221),  “philosophical 
idealism … cannot be sustained and never has been radically sustained.” Badiou or Žižek 
assign Lacan’s work to wholly materialist projects. The Imaginary4, the Symbolic and the 
Real, key terms in Lacan’s apparatus, famously comprise a  Borromean knot of mutual 
dependency. In MES the Real underpins the mechanisms for change that are depicted, 
where the Symbolic perpetually chases a Real that defies any final encapsulation. 
The Real itself can be responsive to, or be altered by, these attempts at its capture. The 
physical state of clinical depression can be improved or worsened by talking about it. 
Similarly,  bodily intuitive conceptions of space, such as Roth’s example of a cube, or 
examples in MES that “in the limit come close to the idea of a circle” (Roth), can be 
transformed through introducing  novel  ways  of  talking  about  our  spatial  movements. 
Roth’s (3.1) suggestion that “Lacan never was concerned with real material life but only 
with  the  accounts  his  clients  provided  thereof”  is  inaccurate.  It  is  not  an  adequate 
representation of the pain experienced by his patients or of the management of that pain 
by the analyst. The misery was all too real. Lacan (1986, p. 203) insists that it “is the field 
of the living being in which the subject has to appear.” The physical state of a body, 
including its feelings, are a function of how it is mapped out or classified by medical 
3 I have not followed Derrida in reading Lacan in the original French, even though Derrida and Lacan, alas, never quite 
reached final resolution on each other’s obscure texts, despite both of them being French.
4 Lacan’s iconic example is of a young child looking into a mirror and recognising the image as herself, an image that 
suggests a completeness that may not be experienced.
experts, which in turn has an effect on the subject’s own awareness of her physical make 
up,  and  how  she  is  quantified  for  medical  assessment.  The  patient  may  develop 
awareness  of  her  own  bodily  condition  and  how  she  adjusts  various  medications  to 
produce  particular  states  of  physical  wellbeing.  Similarly,  exercise  programmes  are 
quantified (reps, resistances, speeds, weights, timings, targets) and may be adjusted to 
produce  different  effects  on the  body.  Likewise  the  immersion  of  students  in  spatial 
environments (e.g. How do I experience moving on a really big circular locus?) works on 
the students’ physical sense of self (“the force overcoming the resistance of the body to 
walking, the opposition of the body to gravity,  or the walking of the walking” (Roth, 
2.3)) rather than just generating mere reportage of that experience. The movements and 
sensations  are  part  of how they learn mathematics.  This  negotiation,  however,  whilst 
peripherally aware of the Real, can never directly represent it. “My knowledge of myself 
is  limited  to  the  empirical  presentations  that  pass  before  my  gaze.  What  I  am  - 
ontologically  -  remains  a  gap  in  knowledge.  In  Lacanian  terms,  we  are  only  ever 
presented  with  imaginary  egos  and  subjects  of  statements,  but  never  the  subject  of 
enunciation” (“The accursed share”, anonymous blog). 
Discourse, relationality and subjectivity
“Words do not belong to one person, but constitute the realities for two; words are not the 
words of individuals, but always belong to speaker and audience simultaneously”.  Roth 
(3.2) attributes this sentiment to both Derrida and Lacan. Yet surely this image of two 
people talking is locked in to conceptions of a circumscribed individual (a subject of 
psychology) alien to both writers. Derrida did not spend much of his time talking about 
individuals  or  reality.  Lacan’s  work  was  entirely  about  subjectivity  but  where  the 
psychologically  defined  individual  is  less  prominent  as  a  distinct  entity.  Rather  the 
subject is understood relationally in terms of his or her identifications with particular 
aspects of life,  such that it  becomes unclear where the individual ends and the world 
begins. Lacan totally rejected ego psychology’s project. Roth’s inclusion of the transcript 
reporting on a conversation between Mrs Turner, Mrs Winter and Thomas provides a 
typical example of how he sees individuals interacting on mathematical tasks, where for 
example, Mrs Turner is “allowing Thomas to understand (the meaning of?) the question”. 
It  seems  reasonably  straightforward  to  decide  where  Mrs  Turner  ends  and  Thomas 
begins, even if they share “realities”. Roth has written many other such papers where the 
expressive  physical  gestures  of  the  individual  humans  extend  beyond  the  sharing  of 
spoken or written symbols. He has also responded to discussion in MES where students 
experience walking the loci of various geometric configurations. 
The notion of “one person” or of “individual”, however, is not always quite so distinct. 
Research  has  described  many  examples  of  children  accessing  mathematics  through 
computers, where the boundary dividing teacher and student is obscured. For example, 
the teacher function in the educational use of Cabri-Geometre can be enacted in different 
ways.  It  is  easy  to  generate  alternative  contemporary  examples  where  the  nodal 
boundaries (teacher, student, mathematics, human, machine) are rather less clear, such as 
between where the human stops and the machine begins: Stephen Hawking producing 
equations  through  his  electronic  media,  children  tweeting  about  their  mathematics 
homework, or sharing an app on an iPad, computers consummating a prearranged date to 
trade  shares  as  predicted  market  conditions  move  into  place  (most  stock  market 
transactions are now automatic), Lewis Hamilton and Felipe Massa driving their cars into 
each other, Arnold Schwarzenegger’s alter  ego terminating one of his adversaries, the 
absence of centrality in the worldwide web. The talking and gesturing individual human 
as an immediately present physical entity is rather less prominent in the landscape of 
contemporary society as a result of machines or pedagogical apparatus replacing so much 
of what had been human contributions. There are also many instances where the student’s 
demonstration of his or her mathematical understanding amounts to (or subjectivity is 
reduced to) little more than filling in a gap in a story provided by some sort of assessment 
device.
There is a difference of emphasis between the ways in which Roth and I are centred in 
conceptualising  subjectivity.  In  his  broader  project,  Roth  (2010)  aims  to  “reunite” 
psychology  and  sociology. He  focuses  on  the  individual  human  individuating  the 
collective  programme  through  his  or  her  expressive  action,  such  as  in  an  exchange 
between  teacher  and  student.  More  typically  MES focuses  on  how discourses  shape 
subjective  action  within  a  Lacanian  model  that  includes  neither  “psychology”  nor 
“sociology”  in  its  vocabulary.  Students  were  asked  to  report  on  their  memories  of 
learning calculus at school. Teachers were asked to reveal their agency in implementing 
new  curriculum  materials.  The  work  of  researchers  in  mathematics  education  was 
analysed to see how the work encapsulated the field. That is, MES (p. 129) asks: “What 
aspect of the whole person is activated (or brought into being) in any given semiotic 
configuration?5 How are they created as subjects? Which discursive aspect responds, or 
appears, and why. 
MES (p. 127) consults Lacan on this point who writes in his usual playful manner: 
The whole ambiguity of the sign derives from the fact that it represents something for 
someone. This someone may be many things, it may be the entire universe, in as much 
as we have known for sometime that information circulates in it… Any node in which 
signs are concentrated, in so far as they represent something, may be taken for a some-
one. What must be stressed at the outset is that a signifier is that which represents a 
subject for another signifier. (Lacan, 1986, p. 207)
The “ambiguity” for Lacan is centred on how the “someone” is predicated in semiotic 
activity. What does Lacan intend by his curious suggestion that the “someone” could be 
the “entire universe”. This term is made yet more obscure by the clause “in as much as 
we have known for sometime that  information circulates  in it”.  This  hints  at  a more 
extensive engagement with discursive networks and their production of subjectivity,  a 
subjectivity  that  can  never  quite  hold  on  to  the  discursive  universe  that  it  reflects.  
Connectivity to the internet, for instance, re-centres our sense of self, our sense of reach 
and  our  scope  of  receptivity.  It  affects  how we  process  information,  make  gestures, 
impact on others, etc. MES addresses how teachers, students and mathematics itself are 
commodified according  to  the  needs  of  an  exchange  economy.  Contemporary 
5 The rather troubled notion of the “whole person” must have slipped into the text accidentally.
understandings of subjectivity centred on human immersion in discursive and signifying 
activity  provide  a  backdrop  to  Lacan’s  pre-internet  assertion  that  “someone”  might 
provide access to the entire network of discursive activity. Everyone is implicated in the 
discursive construction of society and everyone draws on that construction. And thus: 
“Any node in which signs are concentrated, in so far as they represent something, may be 
taken for a some-one”. A subject then is not just an individual human, it could also be an 
agency, a cause, movement, or “fidelity” to a new way of being (more on this shortly). 
The final sentence in Lacan’s paragraph “that a signifier is that which represents a subject 
for another signifier” might be related to an example referred to in MES:
The old style hospital bed has at its feet, out of the patient’s sight, a small display 
board  on  which  different  charts  and documents  are  stuck  specifying  the  patient’s, 
temperature,  blood  pressure,  medicaments,  and  so  on.  This  display  represents  the 
patient - for whom? Not simply and directly for other subjects (say, for the nurses and 
doctors  who regularly check this  panel),  but  primarily  for  other  signifiers,  for  the 
symbolic network of medical knowledge in which the data on the panel have to be 
inserted  in  order  to  obtain  their  meaning.  One can  easily  imagine  a  computerised 
system where the reading of the data on the panel proceeds automatically, so that what 
the  doctor  obtains  and  reads  are  not  these  data  but  directly  the  conclusions  that, 
according  to  the  system of  medical  knowledge,  follow from these  and  other  data 
(Žižek, 1998, p. 74) 
The signifier,  a graph maybe,  represents the subject,  a patient  in the bed, for another 
signifier,  a doctor or nurse reading the graph with view to it  impacting on a specific 
dimension of their subsequent actions. That is, we are not attending to patient or medic as 
“whole people”. Rather we are considering the patient through the restricted registers of 
the patient, with particular symptoms, and a medic only interested in those symptoms 
(perhaps with view to setting a correct dosage), according to the wider system of medical 
knowledge. One could extend the computerised system so that a sensor could detect a 
bodily change that triggered some medication being introduced in to the bloodstream.
This example, echoes countless studies in mathematics education research where there is 
a demand to isolate the mathematical dimension of wider discussion. But such questions 
are crucially linked to the geography of the supposed interface of subject and object. 
Mathematics in schools exists substantially as pedagogical material crafted for supposed 
modes  of  apprehension.  Students  are  required  to  spot  certain  things  according to  the 
given mark scheme. But such apprehension depends on how we understand mathematical 
objects and how we understand human subjects. That is, a given mark scheme supposes a 
given  conception  of  a  student  able  to  answer  on  those  terms,  and  supposes  that 
mathematics can be seen in a particular way, and taught by a teacher able to evoke it in 
that way. That is, as above, subjectivity is reduced to little more than filling in a gap in a 
story provided by some sort of assessment device. In another example above I queried 
how the subject “mathematics education researcher” derived from the demands placed on 
that  designation.  Roth and I  have chosen different  terms  of reference  in  making this 
assessment.
Subjectivity, relationality, personality
I fully agree with Roth when he says that “we cannot stop with our consideration of the 
subject and subjectivity by considering what happens in a mathematics classroom alone. 
…  A  person  cannot  ever  be  identified  by  its  subjectivity  within  the  mathematics 
classroom  or  within  a  mathematics  education  discourse”.  Subjectivity  cannot  be 
partitioned into just those bits concerned with mathematical learning. Seeing mathematics 
education as so many classrooms organizing mathematical learning is only one version of 
how  mathematical  learning  is  taking  place  in  the  world  today.  The  subject,  or  the 
“human”, or the “personality”, in Lacanian terms derives from persistent (failed) attempts 
to make sense of the world. We can never get our story quite right. The Real can never 
quite be captured in the Symbolic, even in a given sub-domain of that Symbolic such as 
that relating to the mathematics classroom. Lacan’s subject (of desire) is always reaching 
beyond the current  state  of affairs,  a  perpetual  quest to improve on the current  story 
motivated by spotting the “holes in discourse”. (Lacan, 2008, p. 27)
In the hands of  Badiou or  Žižek, Lacan’s  motivation  entails  detecting  the limits  and 
limitations  of  the  ideological  parameters  that  shape  our  actions.  Badiou’s  work,  for 
instance, is centred on the potentialities of noticing blind spots in our current story and 
how these blind spots might alert us to new perspectives,  to new ways of being.  Any 
world relates to a state of knowledge. Knowledge, however, does not capture Truth (for 
all), and for this reason knowledge will always need to be revised to fit the times and 
circumstances. For example, mathematics (as knowledge) was expanded when Cantorian 
set theory permitted infinite sets to be conceptualised as objects, and again when the real 
number  system sought  to include  i.  For Badiou,  there is  some mathematics  that  is  a 
function of contingent empirical reference (e.g. mappings of phenomena observed in the 
physical world as we presently know it) and some that is not dependent on such reference 
(Badiou uses set theory to create his model.) But we occasionally have to shift ground as 
we are  not  always  entirely  sure  as  to  how much  mathematics  is  motivated  by some 
reference  to  a  world.  Indeed  mathematical  thinking  relies  on  shifts  of  attention (e.g. 
Mason, 1989) to differentiate between particular and general dimensions. 
Roth (3.3) cites Rancière for whom subjectification denotes “the production—through a 
series of action of a body and of a capacity for enunciation not previously identifiable 
within a given field of experience, whose identification is thus part of the reconfiguration 
of the field of experience”. I take this to mean that a hole in discourse has been located 
and that a necessary adjustment has been carried out. Roth rephrases this as: “the subjects 
are  transformed  by  their  own  actions  that  are  themselves  a  function  of  the  field  of  
experience and therefore are not entirely owned by the subject”. It seems to me however 
that the two authors are using the terms “subject” and “body” differently.  Rancière, I 
believe, is using the term “subject” in much the same way as Badiou as described above 
whilst Roth is seeing “subject” as being linked to an individual human body.  Roth is 
incorrectly  assuming  that  Rancière is  also  referring  primarily  to  an  indivdual  human 
body. In the work of Badiou and  Rancière (thinkers who occasionally share the same 
stage), I suggest, we are witnessing a radical redistribution of the psychological where, 
within  Badiou’s  Maoist  preferences,  individual  personalities  follow  from  a  more 
collectivized account of the world. That is, individuals follow communities of practice 
adjusting to new ways of living. 
In  Badiou’s  terminology,  bodies  (whether  that  be an individual  body,  or  a  collective 
movement, or a body of thought) may be understood in terms of subjective “fidelity” to 
specific cultural adjustments, that is, to events, which comprise new ways of being in a 
somehow  expanded  multiplicity  of  elements  (the  anti-slavery  movement  working  to 
include  more  people  as  humans,  or  votes  for  women  doing  the  same  to  expand 
conceptions  of  the  electorate  and  of  democracy).  One  might  also  consider  changing 
university entrance requirements to rewrite the conception of a graduate to meet new 
workplace  criteria;  highlighting  new  pedagogical/mathematical  objects/priorities 
consequential to the growing influence of international comparative testing. 
The  domain  of  subjectivity  is  activated  and renewed  by such  events,  and hence  the 
possibilities of what it might be to be human. That is, we are not just concerned with 
humans  changing  the  material  conditions  as  Roth  suggests,  but  also  changing  the 
conditions through which it is understood what it is to be human, or more specifically 
what it is to be a teacher or a student. For example, so many “human” interactions are 
now processed through technical media, affecting spatial and temporal parameters, and 
thus  how subjectivity  is  produced,  represented  or  accounted  for.  The living  being  is 
sometimes  less  prominent  in  this  virtual  landscape  than  in  the  exchange  Roth  (3.2) 
describes  between  Mrs  Turner,  Mrs  Winter  and  Thomas.  Roth’s  suggestion  that 
“Thomas’s own utterance is an integral part of the production of the subject” implies a 
singular subject “Thomas” in just one place, with the rather flat suggestion that Lacan 
sees  “the  subject  in the  relation  between  the  signifiers”  (my  emphasis),  as  if  some 
formula of identifications could produce a personality or a clearly defined sequence of 
subject positions6. Thomas, however, has different ways of occupying the space. Lacan, 
(1986, p. 208) argues that the subject “develops its networks, its chains, its history, at an 
indeterminate place” beneath the signifier, or dominant story.  The “subject may in effect 
occupy various places, depending on whether one places him under one or other of these 
signifiers” (p. 209).  These multiple opportunities to set the coordinates defy stability or 
consistency in perspectives or descriptions since the perspectives comprise the learning 
of new ways of being that might transcend the immediate physical territory of the three 
people  present,  such  as;  in  following  the  wider  introduction  of  a  new  mathematics 
curriculum, aligning with a new attitude to curriculums, or in working practices adjusting 
to new systems or technologies (Hoyles, Noss, Kent & Bakker, 2010). 
Conclusion
The method in psychoanalysis entails the production and analysis of symbolic material, 
or of a story. In mathematics education research we need to attend to the texture of what 
we produce. The story in itself is a valuable entity, which methodologically produces the 
research objects that orient the mode of enquiry. This story is not subservient to some 
thing that it is trying to represent (such as how a mind works, or how ideas have been 
6 Lacan’s subject was “barred”, as in Roth’s Fig. 2, to emphasise the gap between the subject’s place of enunciation 
and the enunciated subject. There is a difference between the individual and the way that individual implies herself 
through her descriptions of the world. Similarly, in naming my son Elliot there is a gap between how I visualised that 
name and how Elliot now lives it.
portrayed through the work of historically significant writers, how a meaning has been 
fixed, or usage familiarised). Indeed the story is productive of that thing,  and a useful 
barometer  of  that  thing.  It  entails  looking  at  one’s  own  looking to  see  how objects 
(meanings) are generated within a story that never settles. But the story is also productive 
of the person telling the story, since the story reflexively situates its storyteller. We must, 
however,  be  cautious.  Lacan  suggests  that  when  the  analysand  says  “I”,  the  analyst 
should be mistrustful. In responding to Roth it is more precise when “I”, like Roth, refer 
to the MES text rather than speaking in the first person as the author. The individual, or 
any collective,  is  only ever  partially  self-aware.  “I”  am surprised by some of  Roth’s 
claims as to what MES is saying,  whilst  learning a lot  through that surprise,  and for 
which I am very appreciative. The stories we tell are both part of on-going speech, and 
part of the wider discursive network. The location of the stories will always move on 
since speech never stands still. They have a limited shelf life. The stories will adjust to 
new circumstances. And it may be that our story telling resources will change, such that 
we tell stories in new ways to produce alternative effects. Different stories will be told 
before long. But it is possible to learn from these present efforts. That is, we can learn 
from how those  attempts  fail  to  produce  the  result  that  we seek.  Persistent  attempts 
produce patterns of failure that allude to the Real that is sought. For no part of the Real is 
there  a  final  encapsulation.  It  is  only  ever  possible  to  begin  with  past  illusions,  or 
localised  predictabilities.  Any  adjustment  adjusts  the  whole  picture,  not  just  some 
localised elements. There is no progress through a tick list of certainties. 
For Lacan (2008, p. 17) “truth is always new”, knowledge is always renewable. But that 
knowledge provides much of our everyday reality. The emphasis on the stories that we 
tell is not to suggest that we reject the knowledge that we have. We can learn from how 
those imposed stabilities guide life, or sometimes, whole lives. We may assume particular 
discursive  formations,  set  rules,  introduce  analytical  frameworks,  or  hold  certain 
assumptions for the time being, which influence the research questions that we ask. For 
such  knowledge  is  a  function  of  the  worlds in  which  we  live.  Indeed  much  of  our 
infrastructure (buildings, modes of governance, law, social practices, preferred styles, or 
pedagogical objects, curriculum forms, schools, conceptions of teacher, examinations) is 
a  function  or  reification  of  how  previous  generations  conceptualised  life.  We  can 
however better  appreciate  the limits  and limitations  of such worlds and the forms of 
knowledge that they host, to avoid the false comfort in contingent arrangements and to 
better understand how those arrangements shape our actions. As in many instances of life 
we  are  swayed  by our  particular  versions  of  common  sense  and  these  influence  the 
research that we pursue. This piece of writing is arguing that we might learn more about 
our own common sense to better understand its effect on our lives. 
If Wolf Michael Roth and I were to sit down over a cup of coffee we may well reach 
some sort of agreement as to from where we are telling our stories and what we are trying 
to achieve. Or perhaps, sometimes, alternative ways of thinking are mutually exclusive. 
The task of research surely is to generate alternative arguments, not to suppose that there 
is a neutral scale that allows us to cross-evaluate. The purpose of this piece is to argue for 
theory, not so much for a particular type. And theory moves on in response to changing 
circumstances. To reference everything back to old writers can trap our thinking into the 
false security of established modes of thought and their priorities that can fix both objects 
and the relationships between them.  Mathematics Education and Subjectivity  explores 
how different sorts of common sense are revealed in instances of mathematics education 
practices  and  in  the  discussions  that  surround  this  type  of  education.  The  book  is 
concerned with showing how we might work against those forms of common sense that 
prevent  us  moving  to  fresh  ways  of  being  that  might  serve  us  better  in  new 
circumstances. In that quest Roth and I are certainly at one.
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